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3. Prior to submitting its Petition for Rehearing, the 
State duly sought and received two ex parte enlargements of time 
in which to file its petition. The first was granted to January 
23, 1990, the second was granted to February 2, 1990. The 
State's Petition for Rehearing was timely submitted to the Court 
on February 2, 1990. 
4. Defendant in his motion to strike the petition as 
untimely submits that pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 22(c), the 
State could seek only one ex-parte fourteen (14) day enlargement 
of time in which to file the petition, that is to January 29, 
1990. Further, he argues that the effect of allowing the State 
to submit its petition four days later was a deprivation of his 
due process rights to a finality of judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
R. UTAH CT. APP. 35 GOVERNS THE SUBMISSION OF 
A PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
Defendant contends that the State's Petition for 
Rehearing should be stricken by this Court as untimely on the 
basis that this Court is without authority to grant more than one 
ex parte enlargement of time. Clearly, such a position is 
contrary to the intent of the rules of appellate procedure which 
specifically recognize this Court's inherent power to suspend the 
rules, within only certain limitations, as the Court in its 
discretion deems appropriate. R. Utah Ct. App. 2. 
But, more to the point is R. Utah Ct. App. 35 which 
fully governs petitions for rehearing. Rule 35 allows a petition 
to be filed within fourteen days after entry of the decision 
"unless shortened or enlarged by order." The rule contains no 
restrictions on the Court's exercise of its discretion in 
determining the permissible time for filing a petition. Here, 
the Court determined that additional time was warranted and 
therefore entered its orders permitting the brief to be filed 
within the additional twenty-four day period. 
Defendant would have this Court ignore the clear 
language of Rule 35 by applying R. Utah Ct. App. 22(c), which 
governs ex parte motions, to restrict this Court's discretion. 
However, whenever the writers of Rule 35 wanted another rule to 
apply, they specifically referred to it (see, for example Rule 
35(b) referring to R. Utah Ct. App. 27(a) and 26(b)). But, the 
writers made no such reference in Rule 35(a) which governs the 
time for filing of the petition for rehearing. Additionally, 
even if Rule 22(c) were applicable to the time limitations of 
Rule 35, Rule 22(c) is merely a directory and not mandatory rule. 
It was adopted for "judicial convenience and flexibility" to 
allow parties to, as a matter of right, file at least one ex 
parte fourteen day extension in matters other than briefs. 
Advisory Committee Note, R. Utah S. Ct. 22. It does not however 
preclude an appellate court from granting further ex parte 
extensions as it deems appropriate. 
Here, the State submitted its Petition for Rehearing in 
accordance with Rule 35 and the orders of this Court. 
Defendant's argument that this Court abused its discretion in 
issuing two extensions ex parte is without merit. At best, this 
Court granted an additional ten days beyond that which defendant 
asserts the State was entitled to under Rule 22(c). Such a brief 
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period of time cannot be construed to have prejudiced or denied 
due process to an unincarcerated defendant raising an issue on 
interlocutory appeal. 
DATED this 7 ^ day of February, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney Gener 
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CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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In submitting its Petition for Rehearing, petitioner 
on page 6 of its Petition stated that the petition was being 
submitted because of the State's belief that the Court in 
rendering its decision had "failed to consider material facts and 
misconstrued and overlooked controlling case law." Additionally, 
consistent with any document submitted to the Court, counsel for 
the State represented through her signature that the Petition was 
being submitted in good faith. However, to fully comply with R. 
Utah Ct. App. 35, the undersigned counsel for petitioner hereby 
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specifically certifies that the Petition for Rehearing is 
submitted in good faith and not for delay. 
DATED this '<*^h day of February, 1990. 
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Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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/^~- day of February, 1990 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
GREGORY J. MARSHALL, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 890121-CA 
Category No. 10 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The following issues are presented in the State's 
petition for rehearing: 
1. Did the Court correctly conclude that the State, as 
respondent, was precluded from raising the issue of defendant's 
standing for the first time on appeal? 
2. Assuming that the State had waived the issue of 
standing, did the Court correctly conclude that the State was 
also precluded from arguing the reasonableness of the search and 
seizure based on defendant's disclaimer of ownership of the 
property searched and seized? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Gregory J. Marshall, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1989) (R. 
2). Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the marijuana (R. 
23-24). The motion was denied (R. 54-55, Findings and Order 
Denying Motion to Suppress, dated February 15, 1989). Defendant 
then filed an interlocutory appeal (R. 91, 187). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State agrees with the fact statement set forth in 
the Court's opinion in State v. Marshall/ No. 890121-CA, slip op. 
at 1-2 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 26, 1989) (hereafter cited as "Slip 
op.") (copy of opinion attached in Appendix). However, in 
rendering its decision, the Court presumed certain additional 
facts which are not supported by the record. 
This Court's statement that the State's position was 
that defendant's lack of standing precluded consideration of 
the issues asserted by Mr. Marshall that 
Trooper Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall was an 
unconstitutional pretext, or that his 
consequent detention exceeded constitutional 
limits, or that Mr. Marshall did not 
voluntarily consent to the search of the 
suitcases found in the truck of his rental 
car, 
(Slip op. at 3), is factually incorrect for several reasons. 
Neither party took the position that Mr. Marshall 
consented to the search of the suitcases. Both below and on 
appeal, consent was in issue only in relation to the search of 
the vehicle and trunk area. (Br. of App. at 31-39; Br. of Resp. 
at 22-29). Defendant never challenged the search of the 
suitcases except as derivative of what he claimed was an 
impermissible stop and detention. Defendant's argument was that 
the stop of his rental vehicle for a failed turn signal was 
pretextual and that the subsequent consents to search the vehicle 
and trunk were involuntary due to the coercive influence of an 
unlawful detention (R. 56-87, 93-125; T-l. 32-36; Br. of App., 
Points I, II and III). Defendant waived any challenge to the 
search and seizure of the suitcases on other grounds. State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985). 
-2-
The issue of defendant's lack of standing was only 
raised by the State as an additional ground for affirmance of the 
lower court's denial of the motion to suppress. Specifically, 
the State did not challenge defendant's standing to object to the 
stop or search of the vehicle generally. (Br. of Resp. at 7-9). 
Instead, it was argued that defendant's disclaimer of ownership 
was not only sufficient to negate his standing to challenge the 
search and seizure of the suitcases, but also validated the 
reasonableness of the search and seizure of the suitcases in that 
defendant had abandoned any privacy interest in that property 
(Br. of Resp. at 8). As such, the issue of standing would only 
need be considered by the Court if the search could not otherwise 
be sustained and defendant was not viewed as having waived any 
challenge as to the suitcases. 
Even though the State raised defendant's lack of 
standing to object to the search of the suitcases, it was still 
necessary for this Court to determine the reasonableness of the 
stop and detention, for a disclaimer may be invalid if it 
resulted from unlawful police action. United States v. Labat, 
696 F.Supp. 1419, 1425-26 (D.Kan. 1988), and cases cited therein. 
Here, no improper conduct by the officer was found (Slip. op. at 
7, 9, 14 n.9). But, it remains necessary for the Court to rule 
on the voluntariness of defendant's consents prior to any final 
disposition of this case. In short, the Court must still 
determine the validity of defendant's consent to search the trunk 
for purposes of determining the propriety of the officer being in 
a position to view the suitcases and question defendant about 
them. 
Because defendant never challenged the search of the 
suitcases, the Court's statement that "Mr. Marshall argues that 
even if his initial stop and subsequent detention were not 
constitutionally deficient, the subsequent search of the 
suitcases found in the trunk of the vehicle without a warrant 
violated his fourth amendment rights," (Slip op. at 9), is not 
supported by the record on appeal. The Court's statement that 
"[t]he state contends, on the other hand, that Mr. Marshall 
consented to the search of the suitcases," (Slip. op. at 9), is 
also incorrect. As discussed below, the issue of the validity of 
the search and seizure of the suitcases has only been raised by 
this Court, sua sponte, in oral argument and in its opinion. 
The State raised the issue of defendant's lack of 
standing as an additional basis of affirmance (Br. of Resp. at 7-
12). In doing so, the State did not argue that defendant had 
consented to the search of the suitcases, but that defendant's 
disclaimer of ownership was sufficient to defeat his standing. 
During oral argument, the Court, sua sponte, raised the issue of 
whether defendant's disclaimer could be construed as a consent-
in-fact to the search of the suitcases. Neither party had 
briefed the issue, as defendant had never challenged the search 
of the suitcases. Contrary to the Court's statement that "[i]n 
this case, the state, the defendant, and the trial court all 
focused on the issue of voluntary consent to search the 
suitcases, not standing to assert a privacy interest in the 
suitcases," (Slip op. at 4), no issue concerning the suitcases 
was ever raised by defendant or considered by the trial court. 
By presuming facts not in the record, this Court has, 
sua sponte, raised a ground waived by defendant to reverse the 
lower court's ruling. By the Court's own characterization, this 
was done despite the general rule of affirming the lower court's 
ruling on any appropriate grounds (Slip op, at 5 n.2). In 
effect, this Court has ruled that the State's purported waiver of 
standing is so defective as to negate all other bases for 
affirming the lower court's ruling. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence raised only 
the limited issues of the validity of the stop of defendant's 
vehicle and the voluntariness of his subsequent consents to 
search the interior and trunk area of the car. Neither on appeal 
nor below has defendant challenged the legality of the officer's 
action in searching and seizing the suitcases. As such, no new 
claim of error should be considered by this Court. 
The State is not foreclosed from raising on appeal 
additional grounds for affirmance of the lower court's denial of 
a motion to suppress. In this regard, standing is no different 
than any other substantive constitutional issue. 
Even if defendant has standing to challenge the search 
and seizure of the suitcases, this Court cannot use that basis to 
reverse the trial court's order unless it first determines that 
defendant has not waived the issue and there are no other grounds 
to sustain the trial court. If this Court were to reach such 
conclusions, it would still be necessary to remand the case to 
the district court for further factual findings as to whether or 
not the officer's actions were reasonable in searching the 
suitcases since this issue was never presented to nor considered 
by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
This petition for rehearing is submitted pursuant to R. 
Utah Ct. App. 35, on the basis that the Court in rendering its 
decision in State v. Marshall, No. 890121-CA (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 
26, 1989), failed to corsider material facts and misconstrued and 
overlooked controlling case law. Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 
157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913); Brown v. Pickard, denying 
reh'g., 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (1886). 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE STATE IS 
PRECLUDED FROM RAISING, FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL, A DEFENDANT'S LACK OF STANDING AS AN 
ADDITIONAL GROUND FOR AFFIRMANCE IS CONTRARY 
TO ESTABLISHED LAW. 
A. There is no support for the Court's conclusion that 
standing is a unique issue, more akin to an 
affirmative defense. 
In rendering its opinion in State v. Marshall, this 
Court concluded that the State, as respondent, is precluded from 
raising a defendant's lack of standing for the first time on 
appeal. As noted by the Court: 
Our conclusion may seem at odds with the 
general rule that we "may affirm the trial 
court's decision on any proper grounds, even 
though the trial court assigned another 
reason for its ruling." . . . . We agree 
with the general rule, but find the issue of 
fourth amendment standing to be unique. 
Fourth amendment standing involves more than 
simply applying another legal principle to 
sustain an evidentiary ruling. The failure 
to raise a fourth amendment standing claim is 
more analogous to the failure to plead and 
try an affirmative defense or an attempt to 
assert a new theory of recovery for the first 
time on appeal. . . . 
(Slip. op. at 5 n.2) (citations omitted). It is this assumption 
of the Court's which lies as the false predicate of its opinion. 
Utah and federal case law recognize that it is the 
defendant's burden to establish that "his own Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas 
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 1T3, 131 n.l (1978); State v. Valdez, 689 
P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984). Accord State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 
194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Even a defendant charged with a 
possessory crime is no longer presumed to have standing, for mere 
physical possession of seized property cannot "substitute for a 
factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the area searched." United States v. 
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980) (overruling automatic standing 
rule of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (I960)). Accord 
Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock, 743 U.S. 1166, 1171 
(Utah 1987); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d at 1335. 
Despite the general acceptance of defendant's 
affirmative duty to establish standing, this Court attempts to 
regress to applying an automatic standing standard by 
characterizing lack of standing as a distinct, affirmative 
defense which must be raised below or waived (Slip op. at 5). 
The only authority for the Court's proposition is the 
Utah Supreme Court's citing of State v. Goodman, 42 Wash.App. 
331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), in rendering its decision in State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989). While it is true that the 
Washington Court of Appeals in Goodman made the general statement 
that the government is precluded from raising standing for the 
first time on appeal, this Court ignores the significant 
difference in Goodman's applicability to Utah. Washington is an 
automatic standing state. 711 P.2d at 1060. As such, a 
defendant charged with a possessory crime will be presumed to 
have standing unless challenged by the state, ^d. This is 
directly contrary to Utah and federal case law which imposes an 
obligation of factual proof on the defendant. (See Utah cases 
cited above.) 
In Goodman, the Washington appellate court relied, 
without modification, on an earlier Washington decision, State v. 
Grundy, 25 Wash.App. 411, 607 P.2d 1235 (1980), which was also 
cited by the Utah Supreme Court. State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 
1139. Consistent with the State's position in the present case, 
the Grundy court refused to allow the state, as appellant, to 
raise standing for the first time on appeal. 607 P.2d at 1237. 
Specifically, the court recognized that two different rules 
apply, depending on whether a new issue is raised on appeal by 
the appellant or the respondent. Since the general rule is that 
errors cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, an 
appellant is generally viewed as having waived any error not 
raised in the court below. However, a respondent may be heard 
for the first time on appeal since it is "the duty of an 
appellate court to affirm upon any ground supported by the 
record, even if not the ground utilized by the trial court." 607 
P.2d at 1237. 
The cases utilized by this Court to analogize standing 
to an affirmative defense (Slip. Op. at 5 n.2) are all cases 
consistent with the State's position that only the party claiming 
error is precluded from asserting new grounds on appeal. The 
Court has cited no support for its conclusion that "the issue of 
fourth amendment standing [is] unique," (Jd.). Indeed, such a 
conclusion is directly contrary to all modern approaches which 
incorporate standing as merely another substantive issue of 
fourth amendment law. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 138-39; 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138; State v. Greuber, 776 P.2d 
70, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1989). 
B. Under Utah and federal case law, standing is merely 
another substantive issue of search and seizure 
law. 
Beginning with Rakas v. Illinois, the United States 
Supreme Court has concluded that analytically standing is no more 
than "a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure 
has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth 
Amendment was designed to protect." 439 U.S. at 141. Rejecting 
the previous automatic standing rule, the Supreme Court now 
refuses to "use possession of a seized good as a substitute for a 
factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the area searched." United States v. 
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980). Instead, the inquiry is: 
[F]irst, has the individual manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the 
object of the challenged search? Second, is 
society willing to recognize that expectation 
as reasonable? 
California v. Ciraolof 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986). 
Here, defendant failed to present any evidence during 
the suppression hearing to controvert the officer's testimony 
that defendant disclaimed ownership in the property prior to the 
officer's search and seizure (T-l. 3-47). As such, he failed to 
establish his standing as to the property searched and seized. 
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334; State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194; 
State v. Schneider, 51 Or. App. 161, 625 P.2d 150 (1981). 
This Court would excuse defendant's failure on the 
grounds that he had no reason to factually meet the "defense" of 
lack of standing (Slip. op. at 5 n.2). Such a conclusion ignores 
the facts of this case. The State has never challenged 
defendant's standing as it relates generally to the search of the 
vehicle. Clearly, defendant, pursuant to a valid rental 
agreement and as the legitimate driver of the vehicle, had 
standing to contest the stop and search of the car. But since 
defendant never raised any issue below specifically as to the 
search of the suitcases, the State had no necessity to challenge 
his standing as it relates to his disclaimer. Despite 
defendant's waiver of a challenge to this aspect of the search, 
State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985), the Marshall decision 
imposes a duty on a prosecutor to object on all possible grounds, 
raised and unraised, when confronted with a motion to suppress. 
No Utah or federal case law supports the Court's view. 
-i n_ 
C. The Court has misconstrued and misapplied State v, 
Schlosser and prior Utah case law. 
This Court concluded that State v. Schlosser/ 774 P.2d 
1132 (Utah 1989), precludes the State from raising "a substantive 
issue or 'claim of error'" for the first time on appeal (Slip op. 
at 4). But, Schlosser never discussed the raising of substantive 
issues by a respondent to affirm a ruling; the opinion was solely 
limited to new claims of errors. Id. at 1138. 
The distinction is important, for the Schlosser Court 
did not view itself as creating new law, but as simply applying 
the general rule that a new claim of error should not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. 738 P.2d at 1138. 
Additionally, while this Court specifically declined to see any 
significance in the fact that the State, as appellant in 
Schlosser, never raised a lack of standing (Slip. op. at 4), the 
Utah Supreme Court clearly did when it declined to consider the 
standing issue as "it has not even been raised by the parties, 
either here or in the court below," id. at 1139. Accord United 
States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459, 1462-63 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(must distinguish between state permissibly raising standing for 
the first time on appeal and state totally waiving issue by never 
raising below or on appeal). 
The Utah Supreme Court neither overruled nor modified 
any existing Utah law in deciding Schlosser. Instead, it merely 
cited to three cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition 
that under the circumstances the State should be deemed to have 
waived standing. 738 P.2d at 1139. Two of these cases, State v. 
Goodman, 42 Wash.App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), and State v. 
Grundy, 25 Wash.App. 411, 607 P.2d 1235 (1980), have previously 
been discussed (see supra at 7-8). The third, Brown v. United 
States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 n.4 (1973), held that where there was 
no evidence in the trial court that the defendants had either a 
possessory or propriety interest in the property seized, it was 
inappropriate for the defendants to assert that they had 
"constructive possession" in an attempt to invoke the then 
existing automatic standing rule for the first time on appeal. 
Based on the case law c^ted, there is no support for this Court's 
conclusion that: 
[T]he Schlosser standing rule was fashioned 
to protect the defendant from being required 
to deal with new legal issues on appeal when 
he had no warning of the necessity to develop 
the relevant facts below. 
(Slip op. at 4). The direct opposite is true. It is the 
respondent which is to be protected from having new claims of 
error considered for the first time on appeal, As will be 
discussed below, such a position is consistent with the majority 
view. 
This Court's interpretation of Schlosser is also 
inconsistent with prior Utah case law and in conflict with the 
recent Utah Court of Appeal decision, State v. Tebbs, No. 890088-
CA (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 25, 1990). The Utah Supreme Court, sua 
sponte, has considered standing for the first time on appeal in 
State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 1989), cert, pending 
S.Ct. (Dec. 23, 1989); Society of Prof. Journalists, Utah 
Chapter v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987); Terracor v. Utah 
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Bd. of State Lands & Forrestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986); 
Utah Restaurant Assn. v. Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 
1159, 1160 (Utah 1985); and State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d at 1335. In 
State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme 
Court allowed the State, as respondent, to raise standing for the 
first time on appeal, and on that ground affirmed while rejecting 
the lower court's finding of consent. 
Here, the State, as respondent, asserted a lack of 
standing as an additional ground for affirming the trial court's 
decision where defendant had otherwise waived the issue. Nothing 
in Utah case law precludes the State from doing so. 
D. The Court's position is in conflict with the 
majority of jurisdictions in the United States. 
The Court's position that the issue of standing may not 
be raised for the first time on appeal is in direct conflict with 
the majority of federal and state case law. United States v. 
McBean, 861 F.2d 1570, 1573 (11th Cir. 1988) (despite government 
concession on standing below, issue allowed to be raised for the 
first time on appeal even though government was appellant); 
United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374, 1381-83 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(government, as appellant, allowed to raise on appeal since 
defendant bears burden of establishing standing); United States 
v. Snowronski, 827 F.2d 1414, 1417 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987) (raised 
sua sponte); United States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459, 1462-63 n.4 
(9th Cir. 1989) (government could have raised for first time on 
appeal but waived issue where not raised either below or on 
appeal); People v. Dasilva, 254 Cal.Rptr. 563, 565, 207 
Cal.App.3d 43 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (state not precluded 
from arguing standing for the first time on appeal); St. John v. 
State, 400 So.2d 779, 780 (Fla.App. 1981) (no waiver by state); 
but compare State v. Wells, 539 So.2d 464, 468 n.4 (Fla. 1989), 
cert, granted, 109 S.Ct. 3183 (1989) (state waived where as 
appellant never raised standing below or on appeal); People v. 
Keller, 444 N.E.2d 118, 121, 93 111.2d 432, 67 111.Dec. 79 (1982) 
(no waiver where state was appellant but had originally prevailed 
below). See also United States v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554, 1558 
n.10 (11th Cir. 1989) (defendant waived search issue for garage 
when only argued below search of vehicle on street); United 
States v. Medina, 887 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Schmit, 881 F.2d 608, 614 (9th Cir. 1989) (cases 
refusing to consider any new claim of error on appeal). 
This Court misinterprets Steagald v. United States, 451 
U.S. 204 (1981) (Slip. op. 4). In Steagald, the government had 
taken the position in the trial court, in the circuit court on 
appeal, and when opposing the granting of certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court that the house searched was the 
defendant's residence and occupied by defendant and his wife. 
451 U.S. at 209-210. The government, after certiorari was 
granted, for the first time asserted that the home was not in 
fact defendant's but belonged to a third party such that 
defendant had no expectation of privacy in the home. Jjd. The 
Court concluded that the government was precluded from arguing a 
position factually appositive of all its prior positions. But, 
in reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court did not hold that 
the government was generally precluded from raising standing for 
the first time on appeal. To the contrary, the Court expressly 
recognized that the government could procedurally have raised the 
issue in the court of appeals or even when opposing certiorari, 
but instead made explicit factual claims to the contrary. IcL at 
211 n.5. The government was precluded based on the facts, not 
the law. Accord United States v. Maez, 872 F,2d 1444, 1453 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (state precluded from arguing cont3:ary factual 
position on appeal from that specifically raised and argued 
below). 
United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763 (8th Cir. 
1984), would apply Steagald more strictly by holding that the 
government may lose its right to raise standing on appeal if the 
government in trial asserts that the defendant had sufficient 
possession for conviction. This view is a distinct minority and 
theoretically unsupportable under an expectation of privacy 
concept of standing. United States v. Salvucci, 443 U.S. at 88-
89 (a prosecutor may legitimately argue that a defendant lacks a 
privacy interest while seeking conviction for a possessory 
crime). Accord United States v. Gomez, 770 F.2d 251, 254 (1st 
Cir. 1985); People v. Gibson, 114 Ill.App. 483, 70 111. Dec. 308, 
449 N.E.2d 182, 185 (111. App. Ct. 1983); People v. Dasilva, 254 
Cal.Rptr. at 565-66 (cases specifically distinguishing Morales 
and Steagald). 
POINT II 
IN CONSIDERING THE MERITS OF THIS CASE, THE 
COURT HAS IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO ANALYZE THE 
EFFECT OF DEFENDANT'S DISCLAIMER IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE REASONABLENESS OF THE 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH. 
This Court concluded that if the State waived the issue 
of standing that the State was also precluded from utilizing the 
same facts, that is the disclaimer, to support the reasonableness 
of the warrantless search (Slip, op, at 14-15)• In part, the 
Court based this conclusion on the incorrect factual assumption 
that the State was arguing that defendant had consented to the 
search of the suitcases. (See Statement of Facts at 2). But, 
the Court also failed to recognize that defendant's disclaimer of 
any privacy interest in the suitcases did not simply apply to 
standing but also to the reasonableness of the officer's actions. 
Rawlinqs v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 112 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) 
Here, the reasonableness of the officer's search based 
on defendant's disclaimer need not be considered unless this 
Court were to determine 1) that defendant did not waive the issue 
of the search and seizure of the suitcases, 2) that defendant has 
standing, and 3) that no other grounds exist to sustain the lower 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. Assuming those 
conditions arguendo, there is no basis for this Court to conclude 
that the State cannot factually argue defendant's disclaimer for 
purposes of establishing that because defendant abandoned any 
interest in the property, the warrantless search and seizure was 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
Cases with similar facts to those at bar, where the 
disclaimer was made in response to police questioning, are: 
United States v. Carrasquillo, 877 F.2d 73 (D.C.Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 109 S.Ct. 1742 (1989); United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d 
1570 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Zabalaga, 834 F.2d 1062 
(D.C.Cir. 1987); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 
1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982); United States v. 
Hawkins, 681 F.2d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 
994 (1982); United States v. Washington, 677 F.2d 394 (4th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982); United States v. Berd, 634 
F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. LaBat, 696 F.Supp. 
1419 (D.Kan. 1988); People v. Dasilva, 254 Cal.Rptr. 563, 207 
Cal.App.3d 43, (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). United States v. 
McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1542-43 (11th Cir. 1987); United States 
v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (6th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 
464 U.S. 933 (1983). 
Assuming the necessity of engaging in this alternative 
analysis/ since the lower court never considered the issue of 
defendant's disclaimer of ownership for purposes of determining 
the reasonableness of the search and seizure of the suitcases, 
this Court could remand for the entry of appropriate factual 
findings, Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972); or in the 
alternative, require supplemental briefing on the issue by the 
parties based upon the record now before the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Aside from the merits of this case, this Court 
procedurally erred in reversing the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress. Either this Court must review 
the substance of the trial court's ruling and affirm, or 
determine that the trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous on 
all grounds. If clearly erroneous in all respects such that the 
order may not be sustained, this Court must then determine if the 
State has waived the isstie of standing and defendant has 
preserved the issue of the search and seizure of the suitcases. 
If it so determines, then this Court could remand for the entry 
of proper factual findings as the lower court never considered 
the issue, or in the alternative, require supplemental briefing 
by the parties based on the record now before the Court. 
In sum, this Court should grant the State's petition 
for rehearing for purposes of correcting the Court's opinion to 
conform to established law. f) 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ day of February, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 0 
Assistant Attorney General 
.1 R_ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Jerold D. McPhee, and Christine Smith, Attorneys for 
Respondent, 236 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
(7~ day of February, 1990. 
y^u & 
_i a_ 
APPENDIX A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent/ 
v. 
Gregory Marshall/ 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Petition for Interlocutory Appea 
Seventh District, Sevier County 
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
Attorneys: Jerold D. McPhee and Kristine K. Smith, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt 
Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Jackson. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall ("Mr. Marshall"), was 
charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent 
to distribute for value, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pre-trial 
motion to suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana seized from the 
rental car he was driving when he was arrested. The trial court 
denied Mr. Marshall's motion and he filed this interlocutory 
appeal. We reverse. 
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure of the contraband 
in detail as the legal issues presented are fact sensitive. 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery ("Trooper Avery") was driving 
on Interstate 70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a motor home. Trooper 
Avery observed that Mr. Marshall^ turn signal remained blinking 
for approximately two miles after he passed the motor home. Not 
knowing whether Mr. Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or 
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the signal on, Trooper 
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Avery pulled the vehicle over to inform Mr. Marshall of the 
problem and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper Avery had 
issued similar warning citations for turn signal violations 
approximately five to ten times in the previous six-month period. 
Prior to stopping Mr. Marshall, Trooper Avery noticed the 
vehicle had California license plates. He approached Mr. 
Marshall's vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn signal 
problem. Mr. Marshall responded that he had been having "a hard 
time keeping the thing turned off." 
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his driver's license and 
vehicle registration. Mr. Marshall produced a New York driver's 
license and a California rental agreement for the vehicle. Mr. 
Marshall said he was going skiing in Denver and planned to return 
the car to San Diego, California. However, the rental agreement 
indicated that the car would be returned in New York in five days. 
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became suspicious that Mr. 
Marshall might be transporting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr. 
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car where he issued a 
warning citation for "Lights, head, tail, other." Trooper Avery 
then returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the rental 
agreement. 
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying 
alcohol, drugs or firearms. Mr. Marshall stated he was not. 
Trooper Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could "look inside 
the vehicle." Mr. Marshall responded, "Go ahead." Trooper Avery 
and Mr. Marshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's vehicle. The 
passenger door was locked and Mr. Marshall reached in on the 
driver's side to open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a small 
red bag on the floor of the vehicle and asked if he could open 
it. Mr. Marshall agreed. No contraband was found inside the bag 
or the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall had a key to the 
trunk and if Mr. Marshall would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall 
attempted to open the trunk, but was shaking so badly that 
Trooper Avery had to assist him by holding the key latch cover up 
while Mr. Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw four 
padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall opened the trunk. Trooper 
Avery asked Mr. Marshall what the suitcases contained and Mr. 
Marshall responded "clothes." Trooper Avery then asked if he 
could look in the suitcases. Mr. Marshall immediately reversed 
his statement and responded that the suitcases were not his and 
must have already been in the trunk when he rented the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery testified there was some play in the zipper of one 
bag and he unzipped it far enough to see a green leafy 
substance. Trooper Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for 
possession of a controlled substance. 
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Mr, Marshall did not testify or present any evidence to 
contradict Trooper Avery's testimony during the hearing below. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
M[W]e will not disturb the trial court's factual evaluation 
underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
unless it is clearly erroneous.* State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 
974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). £££ also State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191/ 193 (Utah 1987); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Further# *[t]he trial courtfs finding is clearly 
erroneous only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence 
or if [the appellate court] reach[es] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
STANDING—EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
The state argues that we need not reach the issues asserted 
by Mr. Marshall that Trooper Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall was an 
unconstitutional pretext, or that his consequent detention 
exceeded constitutional limits, or that Mr. Marshall did not 
voluntarily consent to the search of the suitcases found in the 
trunk of his rental car. As a threshold argument, the state 
claims that Mr. Marshall lacks standing to challenge the seizure 
of the suitcases as he disclaimed any ownership or possessory 
interest in the suitcases both during the search and subsequent 
to his arrest and, thus# had no expectation of privacy in their 
contents.1 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128# 138-50 (1978); 
State v. Valdez. 689 P.2d 1334# 1335 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Grueber. 776 P.2d 70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. DeAlo, 
748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The fatal problem with the state's argument is the state 
raises standing for the first time on appeal. The Utah Supreme 
1. The state relies upon the following testimony from the 
preliminary hearing: 
Q. And what was inside the trunk? 
A. There were four suitcases. 
Q. Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what 
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly, 
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me 
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have 
been in there when he rented the car. 
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Court recently squarely held that standing to challenge the 
validity of a search under the fourth amendment "is not a 
jurisdictional doctrine [but] is a substantive doctrine that 
identifies those who may assert rights against unlawful searches 
and seizures." State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 
1989). Citing the general rule that a substantive issue or 
-claim of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal," 
the court deemed the issue of standing waived. !£. at 1138-39. 
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser, claiming that in 
Schlosser the state not only failed to raise the issue of 
standing in the motion to suppress hearing, but also on appeal. 
We do not find the distinction determinative. We believe the 
Schlosser standing rule was fashioned to protect the defendant 
from being required to deal with new legal issues on appeal when 
he had no warning of the necessity to develop the relevant facts 
below. 
In this case, the state, the defendant, and the trial court 
all focused on the issue of voluntary consent to search the 
suitcases, not standing to assert a privacy interest in the 
suitcases. The defendant may well have chosen to testify at the 
motion to suppress hearing to contradict the trooper's testimony 
that he had disclaimed ownership of the suitcases had the state 
chosen to litigate the issue of standing below. 
In Steaaald v. United States. 451 U.S. 204 (1981), the United 
States Supreme Court also refused to allow the government to 
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time 
on appeal. The Court refused to allow the state to claim that 
the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the house searched 
as a ground for sustaining the lower court's ruling denying a 
motion to suppress when the state had not made this claim at 
trial. The Court concluded: 
The Government, however, may lose its 
right to raise factual issues of this sort 
before this Court when it has made 
contrary assertions in the courts below, 
when it has acquiesced in contrary 
findings by those courts, or when it has 
failed to raise such questions in a timely 
fashion during the litigation. 
1&. at 209. 
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Thus, we conclude that the state may not for the first time 
on appeal claim that Mr. Marshall lacks standing to assert a 
privacy interest in the contraband seized to uphold the trial 
court's denial of the motion to suppress.2 
2. Our conclusion me seem at odds with the general rule that we 
"may affirm the trial^court's decision on any proper grounds, 
even though the trial court assigned another reason for its 
ruling.- State v. Brvan. 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985). We 
agree with the general rule, but find the issue of fourth 
amendment standing to be unique. Fourth amendment standing 
involves more than simply applying another legal principle to 
sustain an evidentiary ruling. The failure to raise a fotirth 
amendment standing claim is more analogous to the failure to 
plead and try an affirmative defense or an attempt to assert a 
new theory of recovery for the first tine on appeal. See 
Banoerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) (-It is 
axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties in 
the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.-); 
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(defendant cannot raise constitutional issues for first time on 
appeal); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1005 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (defendant cannot raise affirmative defense for first time 
on appeal); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) ("matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at 
the trial may not be raised for the first time on appeal.-); 
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 637 n.2 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (matters not presented to trial court prior 
to summary judgment cannot be raised for first time on appeal). 
The state asserts fourth amendment standing to validate what 
otherwise would be an unconstitutional search. The defendant 
must have an opportunity to factually meet this defense to an 
unconstitutional search. 
Furthermore, although the Utah Supreme Court applied the 
waiver of fourth amendment standing rule to uphold the trial 
court's granting of a motion to suppress in Schlosser, the court 
relied on State v. Goodman, 42 Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 
(1985), which held the state could not raise the issue of 
standing for the first time on appeal to provide an alternative 
ground for sustaining the trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress. Id. at 1060. 
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PRETEXT STOP 
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper Avery used the fact 
that his turn signal was malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his 
vehicle to search for evidence of drug trafficking. 
The protective shield of the fourth amendment applies when an 
officer stops an automobile on the highway and detains its 
occupants. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). A police officer may constitutionally stop a citizen on 
two alternative grounds. First# the stop "could be based on 
specific, articulable facts which, together with rational 
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a 
crime.- Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State 
v, Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Truiillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Second, the police 
officer can Hstop an automobile for a traffic violation committed 
in the officer's presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. However, 
an officer may not use a traffic violation stop as a pretext to 
search for evidence of a ,more serious crime, id. 
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr. Marshall's vehicle 
to investigate his hunch that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved 
in drug trafficking, we determine whether a hypothetical 
reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting him or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to issue 
a warning for failing to terminate a turn signal, id. at 978. 
Mr. Marshall claims Trooper Avery's stop of his vehicle is 
similar to the stop we found unconstitutional in Sierra. We 
disagree. In Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was that 
the driver remained in the left lane too long after passing a 
car. In this case, Trooper Avery perceived an equipment problem 
with Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was 
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to turn it off.3 
Courts consistently have held that a police officer can stop a 
3. While the warning citation does not specify which provision 
of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated, the state asserts that 
his conduct was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117(1) 
(1988) which, with our emphasis, provides: 
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car when he or she believes the carfs safety equipment is not 
functioning properly.4 
Furthermore/ unlike the officer in Sierra, Trooper Avery was 
not suspicious of Mr. Marshall for other reasons before the stop, 
had not followed him in order to find seme reason to pull him 
over/ and/ before the alleged violation occurred/ had not radioed 
for help thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle. 
In conclusion/ we find Trooper Avery*s stop of Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle was not a pretext/ but was a valid exercise of police 
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's vehicle was functioning 
properly. 
(Footnote 3 continued) 
It is a misdemeanor for any person to 
drive or move or for the owner to cause or 
knowingly permit to be driven or moved on 
any highway any vehicle or combination of 
vehicles which is in such unsafe condition 
as to endanger any person, oi which does 
PPt contain thpge part? pr is not &t 9U 
times equipped with lamps and other 
equipment in proper condition and 
gfljUStmept . . . . 
4. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648/ 660-61 (1979)/ the 
United States Supreme Court stated that an officer has a duty in 
the interest of highway safety to stop vehicles for safety 
reasons. "Many violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements 
are observable/ and something can be done about them by the 
observing officer, directly and immediately." Jjl. at 660. The 
Court inferred that as long as an officer suspects the driver is 
violating "any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and 
equipment regulations/" the police officer may legally stop the 
vehicle. Ifl. at 661. See Townsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353/ 1355 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court held stop justified when vehicle's 
headlight was out/ a tail light was broken/ the license plate and 
windows were obscured/ and speeding); State v. Puig. 112 Ariz. 
519/ 544 P.2d 201# 202 (1975) (suspicion of defective turn 
signals justified stop); State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224/ 224 (Me. 
1989) (stop justified when blinking headlights led officer to 
stop vehicle for safety reasons). 
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UNREASONABLE DETENTION 
Next, Mr. Marshall complains generally that the extent of his 
detention and the scope of Trooper Avery*s investigation exceeded 
constitutional limits.5 Again, we disagree. 
Once a driver is lawfully stopped, an officer may inquire as 
to information about the driver and the vehicle "reasonably 
related in scope to the justification- for the detention. United 
States v. Brianoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (quoting Terrv 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)). 
The United States Supreme Court has not chosen to define a 
bright-line rule as tc^  the acceptable length of a detention 
because "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern 
over rigid criteria.M United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 
(1985). The Court has chosen to focus, not on the length of the 
detention alone, but on "whether the police diligently pursued a 
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain 
the defendant." !£. at 686. 
In Sharpe, the Court found that a twenty-minute detention 
after a highway stop for suspected drug trafficking was not 
excessive where the officer examined the driverfs license, 
examined his ownership papers, requested and was denied 
permission to search the camper, and then stepped on the rear 
bumper, noting that it did not move, thus confirming his 
suspicion that it was overloaded. Ifi. at 687. The Court 
distinguished this reasonable detention from those involved in 
Dunawav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Florida v. Rover, 460 
U.S. 491 (1983); and United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), 
stating that it was not the length of detention, but the events 
which occurred during the detention which transformed the 
5. We do not analyze this issue under article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution as the state constitutional issue was not 
sufficiently particularized below nor is a reasoned analysis 
provided on appeal as to why our analysis should be different 
under Utah's constitution. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 
327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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investigative stops in these cases into a "defacto arrest." id. 
at 683-86.6 
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning citation within ten 
minutes of stopping Mr. Marshall. Based upon the facts obtained 
during routine questioning and issuing the warning citation, the 
officer became suspicious that Mr. Marshall was involved in 
transporting drugs. He returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license, 
the car rental agreement and the citation. Trooper Avery then 
asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying weapons, alcohol, or drugs 
in the vehicle. Mr. Marshall responded he was not. Then Trooper 
Avery immediately askc 3 for permission to look into the vehicle 
and received Mr. Marshall's consent. 
We find that Trooper Avery's initial investigation was within 
the scope of his traffic stop and that Trooper Avery's immediate 
request to search the vehicle and his expeditious completion of 
the search did not constitute an unreasonable detention. 
Furthermore, Mr. Marshall was not moved to another location nor 
treated in a manner to support a finding of a "defacto arrest." 
CONSENT 
Finally, Mr. Marshall argues that even if his initial stop 
and subsequent detention were not constitutionally deficient, the 
subsequent search of the suitcases found in the trunk of the 
vehicle without a warrant violated his fourth amendment rights. 
The state contends, on the other hand, that Mr. Marshall 
consented to the search of the suitcases and thus Trooper Avery's 
6. Dunawav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (defendant taken 
from neighbor's home, transported unwillingly to police station, 
was subjected to custodial interrogation for one hour until he 
made incriminating statements); Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491 
(1983) (defendant stopped at airport, his luggage seized, then he 
was taken to a small room where he was questioned and his luggage 
inspected); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) 
(defendant stopped at airport, his luggage seized for 90 minutes 
to take it to narcotics detection dog for "sniff test," police 
knew of arrival time and should have had the dog on hand)• 
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search of the suitcases and subsequent seizure of the mariiuana 
without a search warrant was constitutionally permissible.' 
A search is valid under the fourth amendment if it is 
conducted as a result of the defendant's voluntary consent. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "[T]he question 
[of] whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary1 or was 
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a 
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the 
circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. "A trial court's 
finding of voluntary consent will not be reversed unless it is 
clearly erroneous." * nited States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 
(1st Cir. 1978), cert/ denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979). 
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977), 
the Tenth Circuit outlined the specifics necessary for the 
government to sustain its burden to show that voluntary consent 
was given: 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and 
intelligently given"; (2) the government 
must prove consent was given without 
duress or coercion, express or implied; 
and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver 
of fundamental constitutional rights and 
there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived. 
7. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery had probable 
cause to search either the car or the suitcases. We, therefore, 
need not deal with the troublesome issue of whether probable 
cause to search an automobile is sufficient under the automobile 
exception to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk of a 
car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (if 
probable cause exists, police can search closed containers found 
in vehicle); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) 
(warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi 
invalid); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) 
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the trunk of a 
vehicle invalid); State v. Hvoh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 n.l (Utah 
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately) (criticizing the 
Ross holding). 
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Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 
(10th Cir. 1962)). See also United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 
1448, 1453 (10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback, 
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 
980-81 (Utah Ct. Appl 1988). 
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a search, the 
ensuing search must be limited in scope to only the specific area 
agreed to by defendant. "The scope of a consent search is 
limited by the breadth of the actual consent itself. . . . Any 
police activity that transcends the actual scope of the consent 
given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect." 
United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985); see, 
e.g., People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope of 
consent exceeded when police asked to "look around" the house, 
then conducted a 45-minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and 
closed containers). 
The trial court made the following finding on the issue of 
Mr. Marshall's consent: "The Defendant consented to the search. 
There was no evidence of duress or coercion." This conclusory 
finding on consent is not particularly helpful in determining 
whether Mr. Marshall's consent was "unequivocal and specific" as 
it does not detail what Mr. Marshall agreed could be 
searched—the interior of the passenger compartment, the trunk, 
or the locked suitcases. The relevant portions from the 
transcript of Trooper Avery's testimony are more enlightening: 
Q. What were the words he [sic] used when you asked him to 
search his vehicle? 
A. I asked Mr. Marshall if—if there were any—if there was 
any—were there any drugs in the vehicle, and he took 
two or three seconds—no, wait a minute, I guess—I 
first asked him if he was carrying any weapons and he 
told me no. I then asked him if he was carrying any—if 
there was any alcohol in the vehicle, he said that he 
did not drink. I recall both answers were quite quick. 
And then I asked him if there were any drugs in the 
vehicle, he paused for, you know, probably two or three 
seconds, and then told me no. I then asked him if it 
would be okay if I looked in the vehicle, search the 
vehicle, and he said go ahead. 
Q. Now, did you ask if you could look in the vehicle, or 
did you ask if you could search the vehicle. 
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A. Well, according to this [his report], I said—I asked if 
I could look in the vehicle. 
Q« So, it was "look in the vehicle"? 
You didn't ask if you could open anything inside the 
vehicle or anything else, did you? 
A. No. I just asked if I could look in the vehicle. 
Q. And what happened then? 
A. Mr. Marshall just told me, you know, he said go right 
ahead. He got out, gathered up his papers and we walked 
up to the front of the vehicle, and he had to open the 
passenger door, as I recall. 
Q. And how did you get in the trunk? 
A. I asked him, I said—asked him if he had the key to the 
trunk and he says yes, and I says—and I asked him if 
he's [sic] open it, which he did, he tried. He was 
extremely nervous at the time. I— 
Q, So did you open the trunk? 
A. No, sir, I did not. He—he could not—there was a 
little latch over the key hole. He was shaking so hard, 
he couldn't even hold the latch open, so I held the 
latch up for him so he could insert the key. 
Q. And what was inside the trunk? 
A. There were four suitcases. 
Q. Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what 
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly, 
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me 
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have 
been in there when he rented the car. 
Q. At that point, you opened the suitcases? 
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A* Couldn't open them, they were padlocked shut. 
Q. So, you broke the lock? 
A. No. I—one part could zip open a little ways, and I 
opened it—or unzipped it, far enough where I could see 
the contents of one bag. 
Q. And you didn't ask permission to look inside the 
suitcases, did you? 
A. I donft recall if I asked specifically to look inside 
those/ no. 
Q. So, to look inside the suitcases, you were based on the 
permission to look inside the vehicle; is that correct? 
A. Well, I retract that. His first response was clothes 
when I asked him what it was, and then I asked him if I 
could look in the suitcases, and he told me, well, 
they're not mine, they must have been in the trunk when 
I rented the car. So, yes, he did say they weren't his. 
Q. If they weren't his, how come you charged him with the 
crime? 
A. He told me they weren't his, that's what he said. He 
said go—when I asked— 
Q. But you didn't ever get permission from him to search 
the suitcases, did you? And at that point, you had them 
out of the vehicle; is that correct? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). I took one out. 
Q. And it was locked? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q. And you had to work around the lock to look inside? 
A. Well, there was a little play in it, enough where you 
could see inside. 
Q. And to look inside the suitcase, you were basing the 
permission to look inside the vehicle? 
A. Yes. 
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Mr. Marshall contends that Trooper Avery's request to "look 
in the carM did not constitute a request to search the vehicle. 
We disagree. Mr. Marshall gave his consent, although not 
precisely phrased as consent ••to search," then stood by while the 
trooper searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
••Failure to object to the continuation of the search under these 
circumstances may be considered an indication that the search was 
within the scope of consent." United States v. Espinoza, 782 
F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986); £££ also United States v. 
Corral-Corral, 702 F. Supp. 1539, 1544 (D. Wyo. 1988). 
Because of our holding, we need not reach the more difficult 
issue of whether Mr. Marshall's opening the trunk constituted 
implied consent to search the trunk under the totality of the 
circumstances presented. See United States v. Almand, 565 F.2d 
927, 930 (5th Cir.), cert, denied. 439 U.S. 824 (1978) (voluntary 
consent found where defendant silently reached into his pocket, 
removed key, then unlocked and opened camper door). 
Mr. Marshall did not consent to Trooper Avery's search of the 
locked suitcases. The state does not argue that Mr. Marshall's 
consent to search the trunk should be construed to include locked 
suitcases found in the trunk.8 Rather, the state argues that 
his disclaimer of ownership of the suitcases should be construed 
to validate the search. We agree that Mr. Marshall made a 
somewhat ambiguous disclaimer of ownership of the four suitcases 
found in the trunk of the vehicle, but he did not give his 
consent to their search.9 The state has not referred us to any 
case where a disclaimer of ownership has been held to be a 
voluntary consent to search. The cases approving the subsequent 
search of a suitcase after disclaimer of ownership have all 
turned on the threshold issue of standing or abandonment, not 
8. See State v. Cole, 31 Wash. App. 501, 643 P.2d 675 (1982), 
where the defendant gave permission to search his hatchback 
vehicle, but did not give consent to search the suitcases found 
in the vehicle. III. at 678. The court held that the consent to 
search the vehicle did not encompassed the suitcases. Id. 
9. Trooper Avery believed that Mr. Marshall's denial of 
ownership of the suitcases validated the search. He did what our 
case law has instructed and the defect in the search was not as a 
result of his actions, but rather those of the prosecutor in 
failing to properly raise the issue of standing. 
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consent.10 We refuse to rely on this authority as it would 
allow the state to circumvent the teachings of State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), and allow the state to 
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time 
on appeal by way of the back door. 
In summary/ we reverse the trial court's denial of the motion 
to suppress as Mr. Marshall did not consent-in-fact11 to the 
search of the locked suitcases found in the trunk of his vehicle. 
Norman H. Jacksoff, Judge 
10. See United States v. Williams, 538 F.2d 549, 550-51 (4th 
Cir. 1976) (court found abandonment and held cases properly 
seized when defendant denied ownership of certain cases found in 
his motel room and allowed the search of the cases); United 
States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (court found 
abandonment when defendants disclaimed ownership of suitcases and 
began to walk away from them). 
11. We do not reach the issue of the voluntariness of Mr. 
Marshall's consent to the search of the car, the trunk, or the 
suitcases because we find there was no consent-in-fact to the 
search of the suitcases. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (analysis of voluntariness of consent); State 
v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (state did 
not sustain its burden to prove defendant's consent was 
voluntary). 
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